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DETERMINANTS OF THE COMPENSATION 
AND MOBILITY OF SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS 
RONALD G. EHRENBERG, RICHARD P. CHAYKOWSKI, and 
RANDY A. EHRENBERG* 
Analyzing 197&-83 panel data from more than 700 New York State 
school districts, the authors find evidence that school superintendents 
were rewarded, both by higher salary increases and by enhanced 
opportunities to move to belter-paying jobs, for having low school tax 
rates and high educational achievement within their districts, relative to 
the values of those variables in comparable school districts in the state. 
The rewards were, however, quite small. The analysis also suggests that 
the superintendents themselves did not significantly influence either 
school tax rates or educational test scores in their districts. 
THE April 1983 report o f the National Commission o n Excellence in Educa-
tion, A Nation at Risk, focused public 
attention on the need to reform public 
education. A proposal to institute merit 
pay plans for teachers, which historically 
* Ronald Ehrenberg is Irving M. Ives Professor of 
Industrial and Labor Relations and Economics at 
Cornel) University and Research Associate at the 
National Bureau of Economic Research; Ridiard 
Chaykowski is Assistant Professor, Departments of 
Economics and Industrial Relations, Queen's Univer-
sity, Kingston, Ontario; and Randy Ehrenberg is Vice 
Principal at Demit Middle School, Ithaca Ciiy School 
District, Ithaca, New York. The authors (hank the 
numerous school superintendents who responded to 
the survey used in the paper; the staff of the Cornell 
Institute of Social and Economic Research who 
acquired a number of the necessary data tapes; 
Eileen Driscoll, who facilitated the use of these data; 
and, especially, Jeffrey Keefe, who provided valuable 
assistance coding and analyzing data during (he early 
stages of the project. They also thank numerous 
colleagues at Cornell, the NBF.R and other institu-
tions, and two referees for comments on earlier 
drafts. The first draft of (his paper was written while 
Ronald Ehrenberg was a Visiting Professor at 
Tel-Aviv University, and he is grateful to that 
university for its hospitality. 
have not met with much success in public 
education, was among the most hotly 
debated recommendations in the report. 
In contrast, little attention has been 
directed to die role that educational 
administrators (school principals and su-
perintendents) play in the educational 
process or to the ways in which they are 
compensated. Given the large role admin-
istrators play in recruiting and supervising 
teachers, designing curricula, setting edu-
cational goals, and managing school dis-
trict resources, they might reasonably be 
supposed influential in determining what 
and how much students learn as well as 
how much taxpayers pay for public educa-
tion.1 Their relative neglect by partici-
pants in the educational debate in recent 
years is therefore surprising. 
Although there have been a few case 
studies and statistical analyses of superin-
tendents' turnover and mobility, very little 
'See Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg 
(1986) for citations to the "effective school" literature 
that stresses this point, 
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is known about the factors that influents 
the compensation of school administrators 
or their mobility. In particular, it is not 
known whether superior "performance" 
by a school district results in rewards for 
its administrators in the form of higher 
compensation or greater opportunities fcr 
mobility to higher-paying positions.* That 
Question is clearly important for policy ebate; if it is found that school adminis-
trators' compensation is not even implicitly 
tied to their districts' "performance," a 
case can be made for building explicit 
incentives for performance into their 
compensation arrangements. 
To shed light on this issue, we have 
analyzed the compensation and mobility 
of school superintendents in New York 
State during the 1978-79 to 1982-83 
period. Our focus is on school superinten-
dents rather than principals not only 
because the former are the chief operating 
officers of school districts, but because 
their salaries are determined through 
individual "negotiations" with school boards 
and their salary data were made available 
to us, whereas school principals-espe-
cially those in large districts—tend to be 
members of a union, with collectively 
negotiated salary increases, and their 
salary data were unavailable to us. 
Of course, a crucial element in our 
study is the definition of "performance." 
School districts and their school board 
members are idiosyncratic and evaluate 
superintendents' performance in a wide 
variety of ways; our methodology, in 
contrast, is to focus on a few well-defined 
outcomes. Specifically, we assume that 
school districts value high educational 
performance and low school tax rates, 
each relative to the comparable outcome 
in similar school districts in the state.3 
1
 None of the previous studies (see Ehrenberg, 
Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg 1986 for citations) 
attempted to measure "performance" and to see if it 
matters. Indeed, March and March (1977) argued 
that the mobility of superintendents is almost a 
random process. Their approach, however, was 
criticized by Schmitllein and Morrison (1981). 
5
 A district can simultaneously have high test 
scores and low tax rates if the district's administrators 
efficiently manage both financial and educational 
Preliminary Analysis4 
Our analysis utilizes data on the more 
than 700 school districts in New York 
State during the 1978-79 to 1982-83 
period obtained from the New York State 
Education Department's "Basic Educa-
tional Data System" (BEDS) annual school 
district tapes. Unfortunately, no data on 
nonsalary compensation items are avail-
able on the BEDS tapes, so we can analyze 
only salaries rather than total compensa-
tion. Excluded from the sample each year 
were New York City (which, because of 
die size of its school system and the large 
number of its local district school boards, 
is not comparable to any other district in 
the state), districts in which the superinten-
dent's position was vacant, and districts 
that failed to report salary information. 
The mean salary of superintendents in 
the sample rose from slightly under 
$35,000 in 1978-79 to over $44,000 in 
1982-83, Each year the variation in 
salaries across districts was large; for 
example, in 1982-83 superintendents in 
the sample earned between $20,000 and 
$71,000, and the standard deviation in 
salaries was $10,000. Although much of 
this variation is clearly due to the wide 
variation of school district sizes in the 
sample, we demonstrate below that other 
factors are also important. 
The BEDS data permit us to determine 
if a superintendent remained in the same 
school district for two consecutive years, 
moved from one district to another in the 
state during the period, or moved from a 
school district in the state to "out of 
sample" status. In the last case, the 
superintendent may have retired or died, 
moved to another superintendency out-
side New York State {though previous 
studies suggest that the vast majority of 
school superintendents serve in only one 
state during their lifetime), moved to a 
different educational position (nonsuperin-
resources and effectively motivate school district 
personnel. 
''Tables of descriptive statistics on superinten-
dents' salaries and mobility during the period are 
available in Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg 
(1986). 
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tendent) in another district in the state, or likely to have a strong "taste" for educa-
switched to a noneducational position—or lion), and districts with students who have 
his school district may simply have failed special educational needs (such as those 
to report data in the second year, with a large proportion of minority stu-
The data suggest that the annual turn- dents) are all likely to .oay higher salaries 
over rates of school superintendents were m an effort to attract and retain high-
only 12 to 19 percent. Each year only 4 to quality superintendents. Other possible 
6 percent of the superintendents moved to factors are characteristics of the superin-
another district in the state, and 8 to 13 tendent: it is reasonable to expect more 
percent dropped out of the sample, experienced and more- highly educated 
Below, using multinomial logit analysis, we superintendents to command higher 
attempt to explain the determinants of the salaries. Table 1 contains descriptions of 
mover/stayer status of superintendents the variables we use to capture these 
each year. and other characteristic;! that are hypothe-
Aside from school district performance, sized to influence superintendents sala-
what forces might be expected to influ- ries. 
ence a superintendent's salary? Some of Table 2 reports estimates of annual 
the possible factors that come to mind are cross-section salary equations of the form 
characteristics of the school district: larger 
districts (where a superintendent's job is (1) Iog{TV;) = ao + M i + ^5, + e(, 
metre difficult), wealthier districts (where 
the demand for education is likely to be where W is the annual salary of the 
greater), districts containing a high propor- superintendent, X is a vector of school 
tion of highly educated adults (who are district characteristics, 5 is a vector of 
Table 1. Variable Descriptions. 
Vatiablt Description 
LENR Logarithm of total enrollment in the district in the year. 
I,VAL Logarithm of the full value of property in the district per enrolled student in the year. 
LVI Logarithm of per capita personal income in (he county in the year. 
LV2 I-ogarithm of median family income in the district in 1979. 
PNW 1979 percentage of the district's population that was nonwhile. 
PHED 1979 percentage of the district's adult population with greater than a bachelor's degree. 
PCHL 1979 percentage of the district's households with children at home. 
pooc 1979 percentage owner-occupied housing in the district. 
POOL 1979 percentage of the district's adult population with some college or a bachelor's degree. 
PURB 1979 percentage of the district's population residing in urban areas, 
DDEC 1 = superintendent had a doctoral degree in the year; 0 = n o such degree. 
CDEC 1 = superintendent had a certificate of advanced study in the year; 0 = n o luch degree. 
EXPS Superintendent's total number of years' experience in other school district as a superintendent. 
T E N Superintendent's yean of tenure in ihe current district. 
EXPO Superintendent's years since receiving a bachelor's degree. 
Sources: 
(1) SAL, LENR, IVAL-New York State Education Department, "Basic Educational Data System" (BEDS) 
School District Tapes for 1978-79 to 1982-83; and New York State Education Department, "Financial Data 
System" (ST3> School District Tapes fur 1978-79 to 1982-83. 
(2) LVI-U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, unpublished tabulations for 1978 to 
1982. 
(3) 1.Y2 to PURB—U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Ctwus of Population, School District Data File for New 
York State. 
(4) DOECtoEXFG—American Association of School Administrators, Who's Who in Educational Administration, 
1976-77,1980-81 editions; and the survey of school superintendents in New York State conducted by the au-
thors in the summer of 1985. 
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Table 2. Determinants of School Superintendent!!' Salaries in New York State: 
Annual Cross-Sectiorm, 
(absolute values of t statistics in parentheses) 
Variable 
LENR 
LVAL 
LYI 
LVS 
PNW 
PHED 
PCHL 
pooc 
POOL 
FURD 
DDEC 
CDEG 
EXPS 
TEN 
EXPO 
ft* 
N 
1978-79 
.127 (22.5)* 
.045 
.191 
.151 
.178 
.357 
.200 
-.073 
.185 
.014 
-.008 
.000 
.002 
.006 
.002 
(5.8)* 
(5.2)* 
(3.6)* 
(2.6)* 
(2.5)* 
(2.0)* 
(1.0) 
(1.8) 
(1.0) 
(0.7) 
(0.0) 
(1.1) 
(5.3)* 
(2.D* 
.842 
500 
logarithm of Annual iaiary (SAL) 
1979-80 
.113 (20.0)* 
,025 
.228 
.146 
.072 
.449 
.009 
.022 
-.147 
.025 
.006 
-.016 
-.000 
.006 
.003 
(4.1)* 
(6.5)* 
(3.4)* 
(1.2) 
(3.0)* 
(0.0) 
(03) 
(1.3) 
(1.6) 
(0.6) 
(1.4) 
(0.3) 
(5.0)* 
(3.3)* 
.845 
557 
most 
.117 (21,2;* 
.028 
.228 
,189 
,032 
.367 
.027 
-.049 
.105 
.000 
.010 
-.014 
.001 
.006 
.002 
(4.8'* 
(6.3;* 
(4.3; * 
(0,4; 
(25: * 
(0.s; 
(0.7) 
(1.1) 
(0.0) 
(1.0) 
(1.3) 
(0.6) 
(5.5)" 
(2.1)" 
.840 
558 
1981-82 
.111 
,019 
.273 
,152 
-.071 
.445 
-.001 
-.036 
,224 
-.019 
.013 
-.032 
-.000 
.004 
.002 
(20.7)* 
(3.9)* 
(8.4)* 
(3-6)* 
(10) 
(3,1)* 
(0,0) 
(0.5) 
(2.2)* 
(1.2) 
(1,4) 
(3.1)* 
(0.1) 
(3.6)* 
(2.2)* 
.836 
570 
1982-83 
.110 (20.0)* 
.011 (2.3)* 
.294 (9.3)* 
.120 (2,9)* 
-.111 (1.7) 
.494 (3,4)* 
.074 (0.8) 
-.080 (1.0) 
.218 (2.1)* 
-.012 (0.9) 
.023 (2,3)* 
-.016 (1.7) 
-.000 (0.2) 
.007 (5.7)* 
.001 (0.8) 
.828 
574 
1
 Also included were an intercept term and dummy variables for nonreportmg of the superintendents' previ-
ous experience, current job tenure, and year of bachelor's degree. Experience and job tenure were available 
for 35 to 6ti% of the sample each year, and years since degree was typically available for 70 to 80% of the sam-
ple. 
* Statistically significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test). 
characteristics of the superintendent, and 
€ is a random error term.5 
As noted in Table I, the school district 
data used in the analysis come from a 
variety of federal and state sources. The 
characteristics of the superintendents are 
taken from two volumes of Who's Who in 
Educational Administration, the directory of 
members of the American Association of 
School Administrators, and the responses 
to a survey of all school superintendents 
employed in New York State in 1984-85 
that was conducted by the authors in late 
May to early July of 1985. Because fewer 
than half of the superintendents in the 
sample belonged to the professional asso-
ciation and the response rate of incum-
5
 If school district "performance" docs influence 
superintendents' salary levels, estimation of equation 
(I), which omits performance, will yield biased 
coefficients tmfew the performance measures are 
uncorrelated with the variables included in (1), As 
will become clear, we have constructed performance 
measures that an uncorrected with the variables in 
(I). 
bents in 1984-85 to the survey was about 
70 percent, many observations lacked data 
on some or all of the superintendents' 
characteristics. Furthermore, we could not 
obtain school district data for some of the 
districts. The exclusion from the sample 
of observations for which either the school 
district's characteristics or the superinten-
dent's degree information was missing 
reductd the sample sizes to between 550 
and 600 observations each year. 
As expected, the characteristics of school 
districts prove to be important determi-
nants of superintendents' salaries. Ceteris 
paribus, in each year, larger districts (as 
measured by the logarithm of total enroll-
ment, LINK), wealthier districts (as mea-
sured by the logarithms of property values 
per enrolled student [LVAL], per capita 
personal income in the county [LYI], or 
census y«ar 1979 median family Income in 
the school district [LY2]), and districts that 
place a high value on education (as 
measured by the percentage of the dis-
trict's adult population with education 
Copyright (c) 2000 Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company 
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beyond a bachelor's degree, PHED) all are 
associated with higher superintendents' 
salaries.6 
In contrast, only two of the superinten-
dents' characteristics-years of tenure in 
the current district (TEN) and years since 
receiving a bachelor's degree (EXPG) (a 
rough proxy for age or total labor market 
experience)—prove to be statistically sig-
nificant.7 Moreover, quantitatively the ef-
fects of these variables are very small, with 
the rate of return per year of tenure being 
roughly 0.6 percent and that per year 
since degree being roughly 0.2 percent. 
Somewhat surprisingly, neither the posses-
sion of a doctorate degree (DDEC) or a 
certificate of advanced study in adminis-
tration (ODEG)-the latter an intermediate 
degree between a masters and a doctor-
ate—nor the total number of years of 
previous experience as a superintendent 
in other school districts (EXPS) is systemat-
ically associated with salary. 
A widely accepted generalization about 
the mobility of superintendents, and one 
supported by the results of our survey, is 
that they typically move (at least during 
the early stages of their careers) from 
smaller to larger and froi„i poorer to 
wealthier districts. It may be, therefore, 
that personal characteristics affect salary 
indirectly by influencing the characteris-
tics of the school district in which the 
superintendent is located, rather than 
directly by influencing salary decisions 
within a district. 
To test this hypothesis, the logarithm of 
properly value per enrolled student and 
the logarithm of total enrollment in the 
superintendent's district were both re-
gressed each year on the personal charac-
teristics of the superintendent (excluding 
years of tenure in the current district). 
The results (see Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, 
and Ehrenberg 1986) suggest that having 
* Both median family income in the ubeel district 
and per capita income in the county were included a* 
explanatory variables here (and in pans of the 
analysis below) because the former was available only 
in die census year. 
7
 We say "his" throughout because over 97 percent 
of the approximately 1,010 superintendents in our 
sample were men. 
a doctorate, having more prior experience 
as a superintendent in other districts, and 
being older all were associated with em-
ployment in larger school districts, and 
having a doctorate was also associated with 
being employed in wealthier districts. 
These findings have important implica-
tions for the analysis that follows of the 
relationship between superintendents' com-
pensation and school districts' perfor-
mance. Even if, within a given school 
district, no relationship is found between a 
superintendent's compensation and his 
school district's performance, superinten-
dents might still be rewarded for district 
performance by increased opportunities 
for mobility to better-paying positions. 
Evaluating the Performance of 
School Districts 
We assume in this study that school 
boards value high academic test scores 
(high educational output) and low school 
tax rates (more money available for other 
public and private uses), each relative to 
the comparable outcome in similar school 
districts in the state, and that they evaluate 
a superintendent (at least implicitly) by his 
or her district's performance on these 
criteria. It is natural to ask how these 
measures correspond to the criteria that 
superintendents believe school boards ac-
tually use in their evaluation. To answer 
this question, the survey of school super-
intendents that we conducted asked the 
respondents to list the criteria they be-
lieved their school boards used in their 
evaluation. Although we gave keeping test 
scores high and tax rates low as two 
examples of criteria that might be used (as 
well as "maintaining good relations with 
the board"), the question we asked was 
open-ended. Each respondent was also 
asked to attach to the survey form a copy 
of the formal evaluation instrument in 
effect at the time of the survey, if there 
was one. Eighty percent (397) of the 496 
respondents to our survey included a list 
of criteria in their response, and about 22 
percent (86) of those 397 attached formal 
evaluation instruments. 
We assigned the criteria mentioned by 
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superintendents to twelve broad classifica-
tions and made a count of responses 
under each classification (Table S). Since 
most superintendents mentioned more 
than one criterion, the total count across 
categories far exceeds the number of 
respondents. 
Perhaps the most striking result, given 
that keeping test scores high and tax rates 
tow were two of the only three examples 
provided for this item on the question-
naire, is that the most commonly men-
tioned criteria were community/public re-
lations and school board relations. Fiscal 
management (the category that would 
include, but is not limited to, keeping tax 
rates low) came in fourth on the list and 
was mentioned by about two-thirds of the 
respondents. Academic performance and 
achievement (the category in which keep-
ing test scores high would fall) was eighth 
on die list and was mentioned by fewer 
than one-third of the respondents. 
What are the implications of these 
Table 3. New York State Public School 
Superintendents' Perceptions of the 
Criteria School Boards Use in 
Evaluating Their Performance. 
Rttpoiat Nttmktr 
Mentioned that Criteria Included: 
Community/Public Relations 318 
School Board Relations 294 
Staff and Personnel Management 287 
Fiscal Management 267 
Curriculum Development, Educational 
Planning and Leadership 202 
Professional and Personal Development 132 
General Management and Administration 120 
Academic Performance and Achievement 125 
Facilities Management 50 
Student Services and Relations 49 
Student Discipline 26 
Parent Relations 25 
Included a Formal Evaluation Instrument 86 
Source: survey sent by the authors to approxi-
mately 700 school superintendents in New York 
Stale (excluding New York Cityi in May to July, 
1985.496 superintendents responded to the survey, 
and of that number, 397 responded to the question 
on criteria used in evaluating superintendents' per-
formance. Response rates did not vary substantially 
across size -lasses of school districts, 
findings for the use of the objective 
performsince measures that we propose? 
On the one hand, it is hard to think of 
readily available objective measures for 
most of the categories of criteria men-
tioned by respondents; measures of fiscal 
management and academic performance 
and achievement may be the best one can 
do. On the other hand, the questionnaire 
results clearly indicate that the two mea-
sures we use as indicators of how superin-
tendents are evaluated in compensation 
decisions are measured with error; if the 
errors are random, the coefficients of our 
performance variables will be biased to-
ward zero in the mobility and compensa-
tion change equations. Furthermore, given 
that more than twice as many respondents 
mentioned fiscal management as did aca-
demic performance, one might expect 
that, on average, the former will prove to 
be more important than the latter in 
explaining compensation and mobility. 
To show how the performance mea-
sures were constructed, in Table 4 we 
present estimates of tax rate and educa-
tional outcome equations for 1979-80. 
(Separate equations were estimated for 
each year and the results are very similar 
across years.) The tax rate variable is the 
logarithm of the futt-valtte property tax 
rale in the school district (total school 
district property tax revenue divided by 
total value of taxable property in the 
school district). The educational outcome 
variables are the logarithms of the percent-
age of the district's students who fall below 
the state reference point on a standard-
ized sixth grade mathematics examination 
and the average percentage who fall below 
the state reference point on standardized 
third and sixth grade reading and mathe-
matics examinations.8 Students who fall 
below the state reference point are deemed 
8
 We isolate the sixth grade mathematics lest 
because k was the only one of the four tests that did 
not undergo revision during the period and thai was 
given in all five years. As a result, although the entire 
battery of tests can be used to construct a perfor-
mance measure when analyzing a single year's 
cross-section, the longitudinal analyses in this paper, 
which pool data across years, are restricted to using 
the single sixth grade mathematics test. 
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T<AU 4. 1979-80 Tax Rale and Educational Outcome Equations. 
(absolute values of t statistics in parentheses) 
Vambk 
LVAL 
LV1 
LVi 
PNW 
PHED 
PCHL 
POOC 
PCOL 
PUKB 
D 
ft* 
N 
Notts: 
GM=> 
hg(0 
-,100 (7.0)** 
-.001 (0.0) 
.180 (1.8)* 
,691 (4.6)** 
1.009 iU)r* 
.979 (3.7)** 
-.417 (2.1)** 
.988 (1.4) 
.271 (7.6)** 
.006 (0.1) 
.457 
573 
tegfCM) 
- . 0 3 6 (1.2) 
- , 2 4 3 (1.3) 
- . 253 (1.2) 
1.351 (4.2)** 
-1,331 (1.8)* 
.670 (1.2) 
- .6B9 (1.7)* 
- . 6 8 5 (1.2) 
- . 0 4 2 (0.6) 
.278 (2.9)* 
.184 
565 
full value property (ax rate in the school district in 1979-80. 
percentage ol the district'* students who scored below the state reference point on 
hg(AS) 
- . 0 3 3 (1,6) 
- . 0 2 9 (0.2) 
- . 3 9 7 (2.8)** 
1.111 (5.2)** 
-1.801 (3.5)** 
.374 (1.0) 
- . 6 5 3 (2.3)** 
- . 6 3 4 (1,7)* 
- . 0 0 9 (0.2) 
.205 (3,1)** 
.349 
568 
standardized 
6th grade mathematics exam in 1979-80. 
AS' average of the percentages of the district's students who fell below the state reference point on 
standardized 3rd and 6lh grade reading and mathematics exams in 1979-80. 
D= 1 -city school district (school board sets lax rate), 0=oiher school district (voters approve school 
budget in annual referendum). 
Scutus; Authors' calculations from: 
(1) LVAI to pURB-defined as before (see Table 1). 
(2) T, D - N c w York State Education Department, "Financial Data System" (ST3) School District Tape for 
1979-80. 
(3) GM, AS-Wt* York State Education Department, Pupil Evaluation Program (PXP) Test Scores, 
• Statistically significant at the ,10 level; ** statistically significant at the .05 level (two-iailed tests). 
to require remedial services, and state aid 
is increased to help fund these services, 
Since these outcome scores measure the 
proportion who "fall" these tests, we are 
focusing on the bottom tail of the aca-
demic achievement distribution," 
For each of these three outcomes (O), 
equations were estimated of the form 
* These tests, unfortunately, were the only ones for 
which the New York State Education Department 
could give us data, since they are the only tests that 
all students in the state are required to take. It 
obviously would have been preferable to have test 
scores for older students and also to focus some 
attention on the upper tail of the achievement 
distribution. For example, data on high school 
graduation rates, or on the fraction of seniors going 
on to higher education, would have been desirable. 
Our focus on the lower tail of the elementary school 
student test distribution imparts additional error to 
our educational performance measures, as does the 
omission of other aspects of educational perfor 
mance that are not easily measured (such as teaching 
students to write, or giving them a sense of social 
responsibility). 
(2) log O, = 6o> + M + w> 
j = \X$ 
where Z is a vector of school district 
characteristics expected to influence these 
outcomes and « is a random error term. 
In fact, the variables in (2) are assumed to 
be identical to (hose school district vari-
ables that enter the salary equation, save 
that a (1,0) "city school district" dummy 
variable replaces the continuous variable 
for district size. The dummy variable is 
included because in the large city school 
districts in New York State the property 
tax rate is set by an elected school board 
(subject to constitutional limitations). 
whereas in the smaller school districts the 
school budget, and hence the tax rate, is 
set each year by a voter referendum. One 
might conjecture that in the latter situa-
tion, ceteris paribus, direct voter control will 
lead to tower tax rates. 
In the main, the estimates in Table 4 
conform to our expectations and provide 
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reasonable explanations of the tax rates 
and test scores. For example, with respect 
to tax rates, although wealthier districts (as 
indicated by LVAL) have lower tax rates, 
since the elasticity of the tax rate with 
respect to per capita property values is 
greater than minus one, they raise more 
revenue to finance education. Similarly, 
higher tax rates are found in districts that 
are relatively well off in terms of current 
income (LY2); districts with high propor-
tions of nonwhites (PNW), and thus special 
needs; districts with high proportions of 
adults with more than a bachelor's degree 
(PHED), who presumably have a taste for 
education; and districts in which a rela-
tively high percentage of households have 
children at home (PCHL), and where 
spending on education is thus valued 
more highly relative to keeping taxes 
down.10 
Similarly, wealthy districts, districts with 
high current income, and districts with 
highly educated adults, ceteris paribus, all 
have lower failure rates on the academic 
tests than other districts, and districts with 
a higher proportion of nonwhites have 
higher failure rates. Failure rates, but not 
tax rates, also appear to be higher in the 
"city" school districts. It is worth noting 
that the equation used to predict the 
average test failure rate "fits" much better 
than the equation used to predict the sixth 
grade math test failure rate. Although it 
would be preferable to use the former in 
our analysis, only the latter can be used in 
an analysis that exploits the longitudinal 
nature of the data (see footnote 9, above). 
Given these estimated coefficients (cor-
10
 A number of people have pointed out to us that 
in many communities businesses pay a substantial 
share of properly taxes. Since only residents vote on 
school taxes, it would be desirable to include the 
share of property owned by residents in the total tax 
base as an additional explanatory variable in the tax 
tale equation. Our talks with officials in the New 
York State Education Department and Division of 
Equalization and Assessment indicate that (1) residen-
tial property data are not available at the school 
district level in New York State and (2) such data 
would not capture what we are after anyway, since 
some business property may be owned by residents 
and some residential (rental) property may be owned 
by nonresidents, 
responding to ty and htj in equation 2), 
one can obtain estimated values of the 
logarithm of each outcome for each school 
district (i) from 
(3) togO,( = £0> + $vZ ( 
; = 1,2,. . . 3 . 
The school district's performance is then 
defined as the difference between the 
predicted and actual values of the log of 
each outcome." 
(4) Pji= log 0 ,7 - logfy 
; = 1 ,2 , . . . 3. 
Positive values of Ps indicate positive 
performance for the district, since positive 
values would occur only when predicted 
tax rates (or predicted failure rates on 
tests) exceed actual tax rates (or actual 
failure rates on tests) in the school district. 
It is worth reemphasizing that equations 
(2), (#), and (4) are estimated separately 
each year. Thus, the structural equations 
that generate the performance measures 
are allowed to vary across years, as are the 
estimates of tax and test score perfor-
mance in the district. 
School District Performance and 
Superintendent Mobility 
As noted above, each year approxi-
mately 5 percent of the sample moved to 
another school district in New York State. 
Of those, about 80 percent received salary 
increases and 20 percent either received 
the same salary or suffered salary cuts. 
Thus, in each year four mobility catego-
ries are observed: about 85 percent of the 
superintendents continued in the posi-
tions they held the previous year, about 4 
percent moved to another New York State 
school district and received a higher 
salary, about 1 percent moved to another 
" A similar "residual approach" to estimating 
performance was used in Goldstein and Ehrenberg 
(1976) in a different context, It is a property of 
ordinary least squares that the computed residuals 
are uncorrected with the explanatory variables in 
(2). Since these variables are identical to those found 
in the cross-section salary equation (equation 1), 
omission of the performance measures from ( I ) will 
not bias any of the other coefficients in that equation. 
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New York State school district and re-
ceived either the same salary they had 
before or a reduced salary, and about 10 
percent dropped out of the sample. What 
factors determine in which of the four 
classes a superintendent wound up in each 
year? 
To econometrically model this joint 
wage change-job change-sample exit pro-
cess would be extraordinarily complex, 
since both school boards and superinten-
dents are involved in the relevant decision 
process. The ideal procedure would be to 
estimate a complete structural "matching 
model" that contains both employer (school 
board) and employee (school superinten-
dent) decision rules. Given the limited 
data we have, however, we instead esti-
mated simpler reduced form models of 
the form 
(5) 
v
 + d%S + h-r 
+ dtjE + * 
j = 1,2,3 
where Y is a vector of characteristics of the 
school district (a subset of the X in 
equation I), 5 is the vector of superinten-
dent characteristics, and T and E are the 
relevant tax rate and educational test 
score performance measures. The nota-
tion /'(state = j) denotes the probability 
that an individual is in state ;, with the 
four states being continuing in the same 
district, moving to a new district with a 
salary increase, moving to a new district 
with the same or a lower salary, and 
exiting from the sample. Under suitable 
assumptions about the distribution of ttie 
error terms (i.e., that it is logistic), the 
system in equation (5) represents a mu-
ltinomial logit model and can be estimated 
by standard maximum likelihood meth-
ods, 
What are the relevant tax rate and 
educational test score performance mea-
sures lo use in this analysis? On the one 
hand, one might argue that the relevant 
measures would involve changes in perfor-
mance over time. That is, a superinten-
dent's mobility probabilities might be 
influenced by whether his school district's 
tax rate and test score performance 
measures had improved or worsened over 
time. On the cither hand, one might argue 
that keeping test score and tax rate 
fjerformance at a constant but high (low) evel might lead to higher probabilities of 
moving to a higher- (lower-) paying job. 
We investigate the empirical question of 
whether a cltange in performance measure 
or a level of performance measure is more 
useful by experimenting with various 
specifications, 
If measures of performance level are 
used, it is important to recognize that data 
on performance in one district are not 
always immediately available to other 
districts for comparative purposes for use 
in hiring and firing and compensation 
decisions. For example, suppose we are 
looking at potential mobility between 
1979-80 (the base year) and 1980-81 (the 
new year). The base year math test (for 
1979-80) was given in the spring of 1980, 
and a district may have received its own 
test results back shortly thereafter. There 
is little chance, however, that it received 
data on the test scores in other districts in 
the state before the beginning of the next 
academic year (the fall of 1980). Such 
information would thus come too late to 
be used to estimate test score performance 
indexes that could then be used in the 
decision to t tain the superintendent for 
1980-81 or to try lo attract a superinten-
dent from a district that had a higher test 
score performance index, Thus, the perti-
nent test score performance measure in a 
study of superintendent mobility between 
1979-80 and 1980-81 is that for 1978-79. 
Below, we refer to this measure as the 
lagged year district test performance in-
dex. 
Unlike comparative data on academic 
tests, comparative data on base year tax 
level performance are potentially available 
to be used in personnel decisions affecting 
superintendents. But even so, if the 
processing of such information by the 
decision-making body is sufficiently de-
layed, a lagged year tax rate performance 
index may again be the relevant one to 
use. 
Table 5 presents the estimates of the 
specification of equation (5) that uses the 
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Table 5. Determinants of Superintendents' Mobility: Multinonial Logit Analysis.* 
(absolute values of t statistics in parentheses I 
Variable 
C 
Y8I 
V82 
MPL 
TPL 
CDEG 
DDEG 
EXPG 
TEN 
EXPS 
LENR 
LVAL 
LV2 
P(movt, S>0) 
P(itaj) 
45.268 (4.2)* 
.645 (1.8) 
-1.670 (2.8)* 
-.128 (0.4) 
1.466 (2.0)* 
.050 (0.1) 
1.307 (3.0)* 
- .062 (1.9) 
-.014 (0.2) 
.121 (3.0)* 
-.009 (0.3) 
- .202 (0.7) 
-4.637 (3.9)* 
1 
P (move, ,Ia0) 
Pfstay) 
13.167 (1.0) 
.071 (0.1) 
.149 (0.2) 
-.448 (0.8) 
-2.006 (1.7) 
-,029 (0.0) 
.586 (0.9) 
-.049 (0.8) 
.075 (I.I) 
.144 (2.2)* 
.039 (0,1) 
.164 (0.8) 
-1.927 (1.4) 
P (itavt sample) 
PUtty) 
-5,494 (1.3) 
.530 (2,3)* 
.054 (0,2) 
-.255 (1.1) 
-.176 (0,4) 
-.194 (0.4) 
.368 (1.3) 
-.089 (3.8)* 
-.004 (0.1) 
-.086 (0.7) 
.037 (0.3) 
-.164 (1.1) 
-.254 (0.5) 
* Also included in the analysis were dummy variables for nonreporling of age, tenure at base year job, and 
experience as a superintendent on previous jobs. 
Number of superintendents in different mobility categories: 
Total Observations 
Stay , 
Move, 4>0 
Hove.SsO 
Leave Sample 
1,408 
1,207 
46 
19 
136 
Variable definitions: For most variables, see Table I. MPL: School district math test performance measure in 
the lagged year in the superintendent's base year school district, TPL: School distria tax rate performance 
measure in the lagged year in the superintendent's base year school district. 
* Statistically significant at the .05 level, 
lagged year performance level measures 
(TPL for tax rate performance, MPL for 
math test score performance). One strik-
ing result is that the lagged tax level 
performance measure (TPL) is positively 
associated with the odds of moving to a 
higher-paying job (relative to staying) and 
negatively associated with the odds of 
moving to a lower-paying job (relative to 
staying). Put another way, among movers 
the better the lagged tax level perfor-
mance is, the more likely the individual 
will move to a better job. Thus, it appears 
that a school district's Financial perfor-
mance does affect its school superinten-
dent's future. 
The math performance variable (MPL), 
in contrast, is always insignificant. The 
poor predictive power of that variable in 
comparison with the tax level perfor-
mance variable is consistent with the 
questionnaire results described above, 
As suggested by the cross-section results 
discussed above (under "Preliminary Anal-
ysis"), having a doctorate degree (CDEC) 
increases a superintendent's chances of 
moving to a better-paying job relative to 
his chances of not moving. Older superin-
tendents, as measured by years .since 
receiving a bachelor's degree (EXPG), are 
less likely to move to another job and 
more likely to leave the sample (again, 
relative to staying in the same district)— 
findings that clearly reflect the decline of 
voluntary mobility and increase in retire-
ment rates with age. Previous experience 
as a superintendent in other districts 
(EXPS) is positively associated with moves 
to both higher-paying and lower-paying 
jobs, relative to staying in the same district, 
a result that may well reflect heterogeneity 
of turnover probabilities. (See Chamber-
lain 1981 or Heckman 1981 for discussion 
of methods to distinguish heterogeneity 
bias from other factors.) Finally, employ-
ment in a school district with high median 
family income is associated with a reduced 
probability of moving to a higher-paying 
job relative to the probability of staying, 
As indicated in Table 1, higher-income 
school districts pay more than other school 
Copyright (c) 2000 Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company 
Copyright (c) Cornell University 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G., Determinants of the Compensation and Mobility ofSchool Superintendents 
, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 41:3 (1988: Apr.) p.386 
INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
districts, thereby reducing the likely gain 
from mobility. 
The last-mentioned result raises the 
question of whether some measure of the 
superintendent's |jotemial gain from mo-
bility should be direcdy included in these 
equations. We experimented with four 
such measures: the logarithm of the 
superintendent's base year salary, the 
residual from a base year log salary 
equation that included only superinten-
dents* characteristics, the residual from a 
base year log salary equation that included 
both superintendents' and school district 
characteristics, and the residual from a 
comprehensive base year log salary equa-
tion that also included performance mea-
sures. None of these measures, however, 
proved to be statistically significant (when 
they were included one at a time), nor did 
their inclusion affect the pattern of signs 
and significance of the coefficients in 
Table 5. 
We also tested for the sensitivity of our 
mobility results to the specification of the 
performance variables. Four specifications 
were tested: base year level, lagged year 
level, both base and lagged year levels, and 
change between the base and new year. 
The results (see Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, 
and Ehrenberg 1986) indicate quite clearly 
that only the lagged level of tax perfor-
mance is significant, with better perfor-
mance leading to an increased (decreased) 
probability of moving to a position with a 
salary higher than (equal to or lower than) 
the base year salary, relative to the 
probability of remaining on the same job. 
School District Performance and 
Superintendent Salary Changes 
In this section we examine the question 
of how salary increases—both for superin-
tendents who remain in the same district 
for two consecutive years and for those 
who move to another district in New York 
State-are related to the lagged year tax 
rate and test score performance measure 
in the base year school district.'2 
"Treating mobility at exogenous here leads to 
obvious potential selectivity problems: we may be 
Table 6 presents estimates of two salary 
change equations for superintendents who 
remained in the sample over two consecu-
tive years. Column (1) presents the sim-
plest model, in which salary change is 
postulated to be a function only of year 
dummy variables and a dichotomous vari-
able (M) for whether the superintendent 
changed jobs (1 =yes ,0 = no) during the 
period. The results in this column suggest 
that mobility mattered; on average, super-
intendents who changed jobs received 
salary increases that were 6 percent higher 
than those who remained in the same 
position. It does not follow, however, that 
mobility always pays. In fact, as noted 
above, approximately one-fifth of the 
movers each year failed to increase their 
salaries; some of these suffered salary 
losses as large as 30 percent. 
Column (2) presents the results of 
estimating a model in which a superinten-
dent's salary change is also postulated to 
be a function of the lagged tax rate and 
math test score performance measures in 
the superintendent's base year school 
district, as well as the differences between 
the base year district and new year distrta 
in the logarithms of county income, school 
district enrollment, and school district full 
value of property per student. (For stay-
ers, the values calculated are simply the 
within-district changes in the variables 
between the base and new years.) The 
coefficients of each of these change vari-
ables and the performance measures were 
allowed to differ between movert; and 
stayers in this model. 
The major result of this specification is 
the finding that, ceteris paribus, movers 
suffer salary losses in the range of 5 to 6 
confounding the effect of the performance variables 
on mobility prospects with their effects on salary 
changes given mobility status. But in the absence of a 
well-specified structural model of the mobility pro-
cess that takes account of both school board and 
superintendent decision rules (sec the discussion 
headed "School District Performance and Superinten-
dent Mobility," above), any attempt to use the 
estimates in Table 5 to obtain a Hcckman {1979Mype 
"selectivity correction" term to add to the mobility 
equations would be ad hoc at best and subject to 
specification error. We do not attempt such correc-
tions here. 
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Table 6. Salary Change Equations for 
Superintendents Who Stayed in the Same 
Position or Moved to Another Position in 
New York State, 
(absolute values of t statistics in parentheses) 
Variable 
c 
Y81 
V8J 
M 
ALV1 
ALENR 
ALVAL 
MFL 
TPL 
MMLY1 
M'ALENR 
M*ALVAL 
M*MrL 
M*TP1, 
N 
ft* 
.061 
.020 
.006 
m 
(87.9)* 
(7.3)* 
(2.3)* 
.060 (10.0)* 
2,208 
.066 
m 
,079 (8,7)* 
.010 (3.0)* 
- .004 (0.8) 
- .055 (4.4)* 
- .110 (1.4) 
-.004 (0,1) 
.003 (0.5) 
.007 (2.5)* 
.008 (1.3) 
.425 (5.0)* 
.105 (2.6)* 
.052 (4.1)* 
-.038° (2.8)* 
.067" (2.2)* 
1.210 
.322 
* Implied marginal effects of lagged year perfor-
mance variables on movers' salary changes: 
TPL - .075(2,5). MP,,-.032(2.5). 
Explanations: 
Dummy variable equal la one if the 
1980-81 and 1081-82 observations dif-
fered, zero otherwise. 
Dummy variable equal to one if the 
1981-82 and 1982-83 observations dif-
fered, zero otherwise. 
Dummy variable equal to one if the 
superintendent moved to another su-
pcrintcndcncy in New York State, zero 
if he remained in the same school dis-
VBI 
Yftt 
met. 
ALVl The logarithm of per capita personal 
income in the county in which the su-
perintendent's school district was lo-
cated in the new year minus the log-
arithm or per capita personal income 
in the county in which his school dis-
trict was located in the base year. 
AI.I:NR The logarithm or total enrollment in 
the superintendent's school district in 
the new year minus the logarithm of 
total enrollment in his school district in 
the base year, 
AI.VAL The logarithm of the full value of prop-
erty per enrolled student in the super-
intendent's school district in the new 
year minus the logarithm of the full 
value of property per enrolled student 
in his school district in the base year. 
MPL, TPI. Math test and tax rate performance 
measures in the lagged year in the su-
perintendent's base year school district. 
* Statistically significant at the .05 level (two-tailed 
test). 
percent relative to stayers. Changes in 
these variables, however, are positively 
associated with salary changes for movers 
but not for stayers. Hence, in order for 
superintendents to gain from mobility, 
they must move to either higher-income, 
larger, or wealthier school districts. This 
result is fully consistent with the cross-
section salary equations presented in Ta-
ble 2. 
The coefficient on the lagged math test 
performance variable suggests that super-
intendents who are "stayers" in school 
districts wit'i above-average math test 
performance receive larger salary in-
creases than other superintendents who 
do not change jobs. Tax rate performance 
appears also to be positively associated 
with the salary increases of stayers, but the 
coefficient on that variable is not signifi-
cant. 
The evidence on the effects of perfor-
mance on the salary changes of superin-
tendents who change jobs is a bit more 
mixed. The derived estimates (from the 
stayer and interaction coefficients) of the 
effects of performance on movers' salary 
changes are found in the note to the table. 
Although tagged tax performance in the 
base year school district is positively 
associated with earnings gains for superin-
tendents who change jobs, the association 
with lagged math test performance is 
negative. We have no explanation for the 
latter finding, which conflicts with the 
other results reported here and in the 
previous section.13 
Superintendents' Influence on 
School District Performance 
Two presumptions of our papur are 
that school superintendents can affect our 
measures of school district performance 
13
 As in the previous section, inclusion of the 
superintendent's salary in the base year as an 
additional explanatory variable did not alter any of 
the other coefficients. For the subset of school 
districts for which we had teacher salary data, wc also 
attempted to test if school superintendents' salary 
changes were related to the salary changes of 
teachers in their school district. This variable, 
however, never proved statistically significant. 
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and that the provision of appropriate 
financial incentives will encourage them to 
do so. In this section we investigate the 
validity of the first presumption. One 
simple way to test whether superinten-
dent* have had any effect on our measures 
of school district performance is to assume 
that 
(6) ft-J^ + JWu-i +<*. 
where Pu a an estimated performance 
measure (either test score or tax rate) for 
school district i in year t, d^ is a dichoto-
mous variable equal to one if the particu-
lar school district is district j and zero 
otherwise, n is the number of school 
districts in the sample (approximately 
700), I*-1 is a dichotomous variable equal 
to one if superintendent k worked in 
school district i in year t - 1 and zero 
otherwise, and m is the number of 
superintendents in the sample (approxi-
mately 1,000). 
Equation (6) is a simple analysis of 
variance model in which a school district's 
estimated performance measure in a year 
is specified to depend only on the district 
and the particular superintendent em-
ployed in the district in the previous 
year.M If superintendents perse matter, at 
least some of the 6* should prove to be 
nonzero. 
Conceptually simple though it is, how-
ever, equation (6) entails estimating a 
model with approximately 1,700 coeffi-
cients, no simple computational task. For-
tunately, first-differencing yields 
(7) Pa- Pi,-i = %^Un-i-h,-z) 
+ ( £ , ( - t / j - l ) . 
That is, the change in a performance 
M
 The one-year lag it assumed in the case of the 
tax rate measure because the tax rate in ye»r / is 
determined by the school board and superintendent 
in year ( - 1. Although ten scores in year t 
conceivably could depend on the superintendents' 
actions in year (, a year lag seems reasonable in this 
case as well. Longer panels of data than we haw 
would permit experimentation with a variety of lag 
lengths. 
index in a school district between year ( 
and year t - I will be a function of the 
change in all of the superintendent vari-
ables. If the same superintendent was in 
the school district in years t - 1 and t - 2, 
the changes in all these superintendent 
variables will equal zero. If a change in the 
superintendent occurred, one variable will 
equal one and one variable will equal 
minus one for the district. 
The majority of superintendents in our 
sample stayed in the same school district 
throughout the sample period; for these 
people, Itt-1 - ln-2 always equaled zero, 
and thus their "variables" dropped out of 
the model. In practice, using performance 
data for J « 79-80,80-81, and 81-82 and 
superintendent data for t - 1 = 78-79, 
79-80, and 80-81 left us with roughly 
1,000 "change observations" and 125 
coefficients to estimate in <!quation (7).15 A 
simple F test of the hypothesis that each 
coefficient of the vector of 6* coefficients 
equals zero is then a test of whether 
superintendents per se influence the school 
district performance measures. 
Both the tax rate and sixth grade math 
test performance measures were used in 
the estimation, and in neither case could 
we reject the null hypothesis that each 6* 
was equal to zero. That is, we found no 
evidence that knowledge of who the 
school superintendent was in one year a n 
help in predicting a school district's tax 
rate performance measure or its sixth 
grade math test score performance mea-
sure in the following year. Thus, superin-
tendents do not appear to have influenced 
our measures of school district perfor-
mance. 
Of course, a more complete analysis 
would experiment with a variety of differ-
ent lags in equation (6) using larger 
"Our sample spans the 1978-79 lo 1932-83 
academic years. We have only three years' perfor-
mance data to use here because (1) the 1978-79 
measures cannot be used, since we do not know who 
the superintendent was in 1977-78, and (2) wc never 
computed the 1982-83 measures, since, in the 
absence of 1983-84 data on superintendents' salaries 
and job locations, they were not used in the analyses 
in previous sections. 
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sample sizes (more years' data).16 In 
addition, the weakness of our educational 
performance measures should be reempha-
sized. Data limitations have restricted us 
throughout our analysis to focusing on the 
lower tail of the achievement distribution 
in mathematics for one elementary grade 
level. More complete measures would 
focus attention on the upper tail, on other 
subjects, on achievement measures for 
older students (such as test scores, drop-
out rates, high school graduation rates, 
and college attendance rates), and on 
variables that are less easily measured 
(such as the success with which students 
are taught to think critically or instilled 
with a sense of social responsibility). 
Clearly, the measure we use as an index of 
educational performance is measured with 
considerable error. It is therefore quite 
possible that we understate both superin-
tendents' effects on educational perfor-
mance and the effect of educational 
performance on superintendents' salary 
changes and mobility. 
Concluding Remarks 
Are school superintendents rewarded 
for their school districts' good perfor-
mance by larger salary increases or greater 
opportunities for mobility to higher-
paying positions? Although the evidence 
we have presented is somewhat ambigu-
ous, our tentative answer is yes. The belter 
a school district's tax rate performance 
measure, other things equal, the more 
likely that its superintendent will move to 
a higher-paying job the following year; 
and among "movers," the better the 
district's tax rate performance measure, 
the higher the new salary is likely to be. 
Also, the better the district's sixth grade 
mathematics test performance in the pre-
vious year, the larger are the salary 
increases for "stayers." Contrary to our 
expectations, however, this educational 
'"For example, wc found similar resulis (no 
apparent effect of school superintend cuts on school 
district perform mice) when tve assumed that perfor-
mance iu |>criiKl I was a function of the superinten-
dent in period f - 2. 
performance index is negatively associated 
with salary increases for movers—a find-
ing that gives us some pause as we draw 
conclusions. 
Another important question is whether 
the rewards superintendents apparently 
receive for good performance by their 
districts (on the two measures we use) are 
great enough to induce them to work 
harder to improve that performance. Our 
study does not directly address that ques-
tion, but judging by the quite modest 
effects we have found, as well as by the 
responses to the questionnaire item on the 
criteria school boards use in their evalua-
tion of superintendents, we would be 
surprised if the answer were yes. 
For example, the estimated coefficients 
in Table 6 suggest that a superintendent 
who remained in the same district while 
his district's math test performance index 
held steady at one standard deviation 
above the mean performance index (which 
is zero) would receive an annual salary 
increase only 0.3 percentage points higher 
than that awarded a superintendent who 
remained in a district with only average 
performance on the same measure.17 If 
the two districts maintained these levels of 
performance over a ten-year period, the 
salaries of the superintendents would 
diverge by only slightly more than 3 
percentage points. Similarly, among super-
intendents who moved to another posi-
tion, those whose districts' tax rate perfor-
mance index was one standard deviation 
above the mean tax rate performance 
(which again is zero) would receive a salary 
increase upon moving only 1.7 percentage 
points higher than the salary increase 
given a "mean performing mover."18 In 
neither case does the incentive seem 
strong enough to elicit much extra effort 
from a superintendent to improve his 
school district's performance. 
" This increase is computed as the stayer coeffi-
cient for the lagged math performance variable 
(.007) multiplied by the standard deviation of the 
math performance variable (.46), 
18
 This increase is computed as the implied mover 
coefficient for the lagged tax rate performance 
variable (.075) multiplied by the standard deviation 
of the tax rate performance variable (.23). 
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On the other hand, the coefficients in 
Table 5 do suggest that a district's tax rate 
performance substantially influences its 
superintendent's prospects for mobility. 
Specifically, the probability of moving to a 
better-paying superintendency in New 
York State relative to the probability of 
remaining in the same district was 40 
percent higher-and the probability of 
moving to a new superintendency paying 
less or no more than the original position 
relative to the probability of remaining in 
the same district was 37 percent lower-
for a superintendent whose district's tax 
rate performance was one standard devia-
tion aliove the mean than for a superinten-
dent whose district's performance was 
only at the mean.19 Given the small 
number of superintendents who moved to 
new superintendencies in New York State, 
however, the ratios of these probabilities 
on average are so small-.038 (46/1207) 
and .016 (19/1207), respectively- that it 
seems unlikely that these mobility effects 
are large enough to provide appropriate 
incentives for superintendents to improve 
their districts' tax rate performance. 
Our finding that' the identity of a 
district's superintendent had no apparent 
connection with the values of our two 
performance measures for that district is 
open to several interpretations. First, it 
may be that the incentive effects we have 
estimated are too weak to induce superin-
tendents to try to influence these perfor-
mance measures. Second, it is possible that 
"These effects are calculated as exp«l.466)f.23» 
minus one and cxp((-2,006H.23) minus one, 
respectively. 
school superintendents actually have little 
control over their districts* tax rates or 
educational performance. Contradicting 
this interpretation, however, is that por-
tion of the effective schools literature (see 
footnote 1, above) thai emphasizes the 
important roles school administrators play. 
Third, as noted above, the shortness of the 
time covered by the available data and 
errors in the measurement of our educa-
tional performance indexes may have 
resulted in our underestimating both 
superintendents' effects on school district 
performance and the effects of school 
district performance on superintendents' 
salary changes and mobility. 
Identifying the correct explanation for 
the apparent irrelevance of superinten-
dents' identity to the two measures of 
school performance we use will require 
additional research, some suggestions for 
which we have briefly discussed in this 
paper. Which (if any) of the interpreta-
tions mentioned above proves to be cor-
rect will surely be of interest to anyone 
who regards high educational perfor-
mance and effective fiscal management as 
desirable goals for school districts. Clearly, 
it is too soon to state any firm policy 
recommendation. We are inclined, how-
ever, to take the results of both our 
econometric research and our survey 
findings at face value (that is, to accept, 
for the time being, the first interpretation) 
and to suggest to local school boards that 
they give consideration to building more 
incentives into school superintendents' 
compensation arrangements to encourage 
actions to influence educational quality 
and fiscal management. 
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